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COMMENTS
ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY UNDER THE
1979 MISSOURI CRIMINAL CODE
I. INTRODUCTION
Accomplice liability is perhaps the most difficult theory to understand
in criminal law. The person being tried for the crime did not physically
perform the acts which constitute the crime, but only aided or abetted the
principal actor of the offense. It has therefore been necessary to prove not
only the acts and state of mind of the accomplice, but also the acts and
state of mind of the principal. The complexities that arise from trying to
juggle these four variables into a conviction or an acquittal are seemingly
endless. Most existing accomplice liability statutes provide few guidelines,
and the judiciary is not always consistent in its terminology. In response to
dissatisfaction with traditional accomplice liability statutes, several state
legislatures have enacted remedial legislation to provide for more uniform
application and analysis. 1
The 1979 Missouri Criminal Code has made several major changes in
the area of accomplice liability.2 Although Missouri's provisions are
1. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-1, 5-2, 5-3 1973; OR. REV. STAT. §§
161.150-.165; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, §§ 7.01-.03 (Vernon 1974).
2. MO. CRIM. CODE §§ 562.036-.051 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979) (repealing RSMO
§§ 556.170-.190 (1969)).
RSMO § 562.036, Accountability for conduct, provides:
A person with the required culpable mental state is guilty of an of-
fense if it is commited by his own conduct or by the conduct of another
person for which he is criminally responsible, or both.
RSMo § 562.041, Responsibility for the conduct of another, provides:
1. A person is criminally responsible for the conduct of another when
(1) The statute defining the offense makes him so responsible; or(2) Either before or during the commission of an offense with the
purpose of promoting the commission of an offense, he aids or agrees to
aid or attempts to aid such other person in planning, committing or at-
tempting to commit the offense.
2. However, a person is not so responsible if:
(1) He is the victim of the offense committed or attempted;(2) The offense is so defined that his conduct was necessarily inci-
dent to the commission or attempt to commit the offense. If his conduct
constitutes a related but separate offense, he is criminally responsible for
that offense but not for the conduct or offense committed or attempted
by the other person;
(3) Before the commission of the offense he abandons his purpose
and gives timely warning to law enforcement authorities or otherwise
makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense.
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similar to newly adopted provisions of other states, the Missouri provisions
are unique in their wording and application. In some ways the 1979 Crim-
inal Code has expanded the scope of accomplice liability, and in other
ways it has narrowed the scope. It is now clear that persons who unsuccess-
fully attempt to aid the commission of a crime are subject to liability.3 The
state of mind requirement for the accomplice has been modified which
may affect the application of the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequence rule.4 An affirmative defense of withdrawal is now
available to a defendant who makes an effort to absolve himself from
liability by trying to prevent the crime.5 Many common law defenses have
been statutorily precluded, and certain persons are excepted from liabil-
ity. 6 The purpose of this comment is to discuss these and other changes
made by the 1979 Missouri Criminal Code in Missouri's law of accomplice
liability.
II. PARTIES TO THE OFFENSE
Parties to felonies at common law were classified as principal in the
first degree, principal in the second degree, accessory before the fact, and
accessory after the fact.7 The principal in the first degree is the criminal
actor, or the party who does the act or omission with the requisite state of
mind for the commission of the offense. The principal in the second degree
is present at the scene of the crime and in some manner aids, assists, or en-
courages the perpetrator.8 An accessory before the fact is not present at the
3. The defense provided by subdivision (3) of subsecion 2 is an affir-
mative defense.
RSMO § 562.046, Defenses precluded, provides:
It is no defense to any prosecution for an offense in which the
criminal responsibility of the defendant is based upon the conduct of
another that
(1) Such other person has been acquitted or has not been convicted
or has been convicted of some other offense or degree of offense or lacked
criminal capacity or was unaware of the defendant's criminal purpose or
is immune from prosecution or is not amendable to justice; or
(2) The defendant does not belong to that class of persons who was
legally capable of committing the offense in an individual capacity.
RSMO § 562.051, Conviction of different degrees of offenses, provides:
Except as otherwise provided, when two or more persons are
criminally responsible for an offense which is divided into degrees, each
person is guilty of such degree as is compatible with his own culpable
mental state and with his own accountability for an aggravating or
mitigating fact or circumstance.
3. MO. CRIM. CODE§ 562.041.1(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 1979). See text accompany-
ing notes 48-52 infra.
4. Id. §§ 562.036, 562.041.1(2). See text accompanying notes 113-61
infra.
5. Id. § 562.041.2(3). See text accompanying notes 206-29 infra.
6. Id. § 562.046. See text accompanying notes 162-205 infra.
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scene of the crime, but orders, procures, assists, incites, encourages, or in
some way aids the principal in the first degree before the commission of the
offense. 9 An accessory after the fact is one who gives aid to a felon after the
commission of the crime has been completed. 10
At common law there were several technical procedural problems
which shielded accessories from liability in spite of evidence of their crim-
inal assistance." The former Missouri statute on accomplice liability
abrogated the procedural differences and the distinctions between prin-
cipal in the first degree, principal in the second degree, and accessory
before the fact by providing that a principal in the second degree and an
accessory before the fact could be charged, tried, and convicted in the
same manner as the principal in the first degree.12 In other words, the in-
formation or indictment did not need to allege facts of aiding and abet-
ting, but could have charged the aider and abettor with the commission of
the crime of the principal. 13
The 1979 Criminal Code does not refer to principals or accessories. 14
Instead it describes the conditions under which a person is criminally
responsible for the conduct of another. The scope of section 562.041,
which deals with responsibility for the conduct of another, encompasses
both a principal in the second degree and an accessory before the fact.
III. CONDUCT NECESSARY FOR ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
A. Conduct of the Principal
Aiding and abetting has been a standard legislatures and courts have
used to deem one person guilty of a crime that was committed by someone
else. 15 At least four requirements had to be met for the accomplice liability
theory to be applicable: (1) a crime must have been committed by the prin-
cipal actor; 16 (2) the principal actor must have had the requisite state of
9. Id.
10. Id. An accessory after the fact is not an accomplice and is dealt with in
the 1979 Criminal Code in Chapter 575, Administration ofJustice. An accessory
after the fact will not be discussed in this comment.
11. For further information, see generally W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT,
CRIMINAL LAW § 63 at 495-501 (1972).
12. RSMo § 556.170 (1969).
13. State v. West, 484 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. 1972); State v. Spic, 389 S.W.2d 35
(Mo. 1965); State v. Fredericks, 85 Mo. 145 (1884); State v. Ostman, 147 Mo.
App. 422, 126 S.W. 961 (St. L. 1910).
14. For purposes of this comment, principals in the first degree will
hereinafter be referred to as "principal," and principals in the second degree and
accessories before the fact will hereinafter be referred to as "accomplices" or "ac-
cessories."
15. See, e.g., State v. Gideon, 453 S.W.2d 938 (Mo. 1970); State v. Slade,
338 S.W.2d 802 (Mo. 1960); State v. Butler, 310 S.W.2d 952 (Mo. 1958).
16. See State v. Davis, 319 Mo. 1222, 6 S.W.2d 609 (En Banc 1928) (revers-
ing an attempted murder conviction on the grounds that no overt step toward the
commission of the crime had been taken).
1979] 235
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mind;17 (3) the defendant must have aided or abetted the commission of
the crime;18 and (4) the defendant must have had the purpose of aiding or
abetting.19 If these four requirements were met at common law, the con-
duct of the principal and the required culpable state of mind were im-
puted to the aider and abettor, and he could be convicted as if he had per-
sonally committed the crime. 20
The 1979 Criminal Code section entitled "Responsibility for the Con-
duct of Another" 2' makes aiding the commission of an offense a means of
imputing only the conduct of another person to the accessorial defendant.
The guilt of the defendant depends upon his own culpable state of mind.
To illustrate the effect of this provision it is helpful to re-analyze State v.
Hayes,22 a well known Missouri case. The defendant, Hayes, proposed a
burglary to Hill who feigned agreement intending to have Hayes arrested.
Hayes helped boost Hill through the window but remained outside to
receive the stolen goods. Hayes was convicted of burglary upon proof that
he was an accomplice to Hill. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, holding that since Hill did not intend to permanently deprive
the owner of the goods he had not committed a burglary. Hayes did not
enter the store, so neither had he committed a burglary as a principal in
the first degree. Because there was no burglary committed by a principal
in the first degree, there could be no accomplice.
Under the 1979 Criminal Code, the court would have reached a dif-
ferent result. The defendant, Hayes, intended to permanently deprive the
owner of the goods. 23 Hayes had the purpose of aiding the conduct of what
he believed to be a burglary. 24 Under section 562.041 he would be crimi-
nally responsible for the conduct of Hill, which was the conduct of enter-
ing the premises unlawfully. Only the conduct of Hill would be imputed to
Hayes, and when this conduct is combined with Hayes' guilty state of
mind, Hayes could be convicted of burglary.
State v. Hayes represents the simpler analysis, since the principal actu-
ally committed the acts that constituted burglary. The more difficult fact
situation is where the principal actor does not complete the acts of the
crime. Suppose Hill had not entered the store, but only opened the win-
dow. Hill's conduct would be imputed to Hayes, but since there was no
entering, it could not be classified as burglary. However, if opening the
window is considered a substantial step in committing a burglary, Hayes
17. See State v. Hayes, 105 Mo. 76, 16 S.W. 514 (1891).
18. See generally cases cited note 28 infra.
19. See generally cases cited note 66 infra.
20. See generally cases cited note 13 supra.
21. MO. CRIM. CODE § 562.041 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
22. 105 Mo. 76, 16 S.W. 514 (1891).
23. See MO. GRIM. CODE § 562.036 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979) (requires that the ac-
complice have the requisite state of mind for the underlying felony).
24. See id. § 562.041.1(2) (requires that the accomplice have the purpose of
promoting the commission of the offense).
236 [Vol. 44
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could be convicted of attempted burglary. 25 If Hill had merely looked in
the window, this is the conduct that would be imputed to Hayes. Looking
in a window probably is not a substantial step toward the commission of a
burglary and would not rise to the level of a criminal attempt. Hayes would
have the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the goods, and he
would have the purpose of aiding Hill in a burglary. Nonetheless, since
there probably is no act of Hayes, nor of Hill that could be imputed to
Hayes, that constitutes a burglary or a substantial step towards a burglary,
Hayes could not be convicted of either burglary or of attempted burg-
lary.2 6
B. Conduct of the Accomplice
Application of accomplice liability theory is only necessary when the
defendant did not commit all of the acts essential for the commission of the
offense, but participated in its commission in some manner. 27 This means
that not only must the state prove the conduct of the principal which con-
stituted the crime, but the state also must prove conduct on the part of the
defendant that constituted the aiding. As there are no statutory guidelines
to determine what specific acts or conduct constitutes aiding the commis-
sion of an offense, it is necessary to examine Missouri case law.
Judicial decisions have made it clear that guilt must be based on some
form of affirmative participation, such as counseling, commanding, pro-
curing, encouraging, facilitating, or assisting in the commission of the
offense. 28 The Missouri Supreme Court has indicated that verbal en-
25. See id. § 564.011 (provides that a person is guilty of an attempt to com-
mit an offense if he does any act which is a substantial step in the commission of
that offense).
26. This does not mean that Hayes could not be brought to justice. He could
still be charged with conspiracy to commit burglary if the agreement between
Hayes and Hill could be proved. Hayes is still responsible for his own activities and
can be charged with any crimes he commits.
27. See State v. Gideon, 453 S.W.2d 938 (Mo. 1970).
28. See State v. Stockdale, 415 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Mo. 1967) (affirmed rob-
bery conviction of accomplice who served as lookout and kept passersby away,
stating, "[e]vidence fairly showing any form of affirmative participation, or that
the accused in any way aided, abetted or encouraged another in the commission
of a crime is sufficient to support a conviction."); State v. Siekermann, 367
S.W.2d 643 (Mo. 1963) (affirmed abortion conviction of defendant who drove
the car to pick up the women and drop them off at the abortion home); State v.
Present, 344 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1961) (affirmed conviction of stealing personal pro-
perty, holding that there was evidence of one act, going down the platform and
looking in a window, which might reasonably have been construed as affirmative
act of participation); State v. Lewis, 539 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975)
(fact of noninterference in the criminal act or failure to notify the police is not
sufficient to support a charge as a principal or an accomplice); Kansas City v.
Lane, 391 S.W.2d 955 (K.C. Mo. App. 1965); State v. Muchnick, 334 S.W.2d
386, 389 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960) (reversed conviction of "permitting" a person
under the age of 21 to assist in the sale of liquor, stating, "[t]o permit or suffer im-
1979]
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couragement is sufficient, and no physical act of participation is neces-
sary, 29 although this may be changed by the 1979 Criminal Code.
3 0
Mere presence at the scene of the crime is not enough, even with
knowledge that a crime is being committed and a desire that it be commit-
ted successfully. 3 ' Even where the defendant is present for the purpose of
aiding the commission of the crime, without some form of affirmative par-
ticipation in furtherance of that purpose there is no liability.3 2 Presence
may raise an inference of complicity and the trier of fact may consider
companionship plus conduct before and after the perpetration of the
offense to infer participation.3 3 Actual presence at the scene of the crime is
plies no affirmative act-involves no intent. It is mere passivity, indifference, abs-
taining from preventive action.").
29. State v. Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1957); McMannus v. Lee, 43 Mo.
206, 208 (1869) ("any person who is present at the commission of a trespass,
encouraging or exciting the same by words, gestures, looks or signs, or who in any
way or by any means countenances or approves the same, is in law deemed to be
an aider and abettor.").
30. Verbal encouragement may not be sufficient for liability under the 1979
Criminal Code. See text accompanying notes 36-47 infra.
31. See State v. Irby, 423 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. 1968); State v. Castaldi, 386
S.W.2d 392, 395 (Mo. 1965) (conviction of tampering with auto reversed on the
grounds that mere presence of the defendant at the scene of the crime was insuffi-
cient to render him a participant. There was no evidence from which it could be
inferred that the defendant "encouraged or excited the commission of the
offense, or participated therein, before or during the occasion when the deputy
arrived,* by words, gestures, looks, signs, or that he otherwise countenanced,
approved or associated himself with the criminal activity. . ."); State v. Bresse,
326 Mo. 885, 893, 33 S.W.2d 919, 922 (1930) (reversed stealing conviction of
defendant who before and after theft was in the company of the person who stole
the car. "Neither the purpose to commit a crime nor the intent to commit a
crime, without an act in furtherance of that purpose or intent, is a legal offense.
One may not be held criminally responsible for a state of mind unaccompanied
by an act."); State v. Odbur, 317 Mo. 372, 295 S.W. 734 (1927) (defendant's
presence at assault and holding of principal's horse held insufficient to show he
aided resulting homicide); State v. Favell, 411 S.W.2d 245, 249 (St. L. Mo. App.
1967) (reversing a conviction of theft, the court stated "[t]he crucial point is that
the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant par-
ticipated in the theft or that he sought in any way to make it succeed. At most we
may infer that the defendant was present during asportation- that is not
enough"); State v. Mathis, 129 S.W.2d 20, 22 (St. L. Mo. App. 1939) (reversing
a conviction of petit larceny, the court stated that "[a] mere presence combined
with a refusal to interfere or with concealing the fact, or a mere knowledge that a
crime is about to be committed, or a mental approbation of what is done while
the will contributes nothing to the doing will not create guilt").
32. See generally cases cited notes 28 & 31 supra.
33. State v. Gregory, 406 S.W.2d 662 (Mo. 1966) (affirmed conviction of
first degree robbery on the basis of evidence of defendant's movements, his times
of arrival and departure from the gas station where the robbery took place, his
immediate proximity at the time of the actual robbery, his apparent acquain-
tance with the robbers, and his conversations with one or both of them, which
created an inference that he aided and abetted in the perpetration of the crime);
[Vol. 44238
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not necessary for liability. The defendant may be constructively present if,
prior to the offense, he performs some act of procurement, encourage-
ment, or assistance with the purpose of promoting the commission of the
offense.3 4
The net effect of these rules is that an accomplice can be convicted of a
crime on the basis of conduct that in an isolated situation would not be
considered criminal or constitute any elements of the crime of which he is
convicted. For example, standing on a street corner and whistling at the
sight of a patrol car is not criminal, nor is it an element of burglary. Yet, if
this is done with the purpose of warning someone who is committing a
burglary,3 5 the whistler could be convicted of burglary.
In many instances, prior Missouri case law will be an adequate guide to
determine whether the accomplice aided the principal actor in commit-
ting the crime. The new code section 562.041 imposes accomplice liability
on one who "aids or agrees to aid or attempts to aid" a person who commits
a crime. Conspicuously absent is any reference to either principals in the
second degree or the imposition of liability for abetting. The prior
Missouri statute referred to principals in the second degree,36 who are
"aiders and abettors,"3 and previous Missouri cases almost universally im-
posed accomplice liability using language such as "aiding and abetting."38
The use of the term aid without others such as abet or encourage, a step
not taken in some other jurisdictions, 39 may in one sense narrow the scope
State v. Ramsey, 368 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. 1963) (affirmed conviction of second
degree burglary; defendant was a passenger in a car that was at the scene of the
attempted burglary and burglar tools were found in the back seat; court held that
these circumstances raised a fair and reasonable inference of concerted action,
which involved the defendant as principal or aider and abettor); State v. Corbin,
186 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. 1945); State v. Jackson, 519 S.W.2d 551 (Mo. App. D. St.
L. 1975) (affirmed conviction of second degree burglary on the basis of evidence
that the defendant was seen running from the scene of the burglary and his car
was parked nearby).
34. State v. Slade, 338 S.W.2d 802 (Mo. 1960).
35. MO. GRIM. CODE § 569.160 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
36. RSMo § 556.170 (1969).
37. State v. Stidham, 449 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Mo. 1970) ("aided, abetted,
assisted or encouraged"); State v. Clymer, 159 S.W.2d 808, 810 (Mo. 1942)
("aiding and abetting those who actually commit the offense"); State v. Phillips,
24 Mo. 475, 481 (1857) ("aiding and abetting", "aiding and encouraging"). A
principal in the second degree is one who is present "aiding and abetting the fact
to be done." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1356 (4th ed. 1951).
38. See notes 28, 29, 31 & 33supra. See also State v. Tripp, 303 S.W.2d 627,
631 (Mo. 1957) ("conspiring and counseling").
39. Other state criminal codes which have recently been adopted retain the
terms "encourage" or "abet" in their accomplice liability statutes. See, e.g., ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-2(c) (1973) ("Either before or during the commission of an
offense, and the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids,
abets, agrees or attempts to aid such other person in the planning or the commis-
sion of the offense."); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 7.02(a)(2) (Vernon 1974)
("A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of
2391979]
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of accomplice liability. 40 Although aid and abet can be said to be syno-
nyms, the term abet has a more technical meaning than the term aid. Aid
means to support, help, assist or strengthen, or act in cooperation with
someone. 41 The word aid implies physical participation in the offense on
the part of the person giving the aid. The definition of the term abet in-
cludes knowledge of the wrongful purpose of the perpetrator and counsel
and encouragement in the crime. 42 The omission of the word abet from
section 562.041 could be interpreted to mean that mere verbal encourage-
ment to commit the crime is no longer sufficient to impose accomplice
liability. 43
If mere verbal encouragement before or during the commission of the
offense is no longer sufficient for a conviction of the underlying crime, the
scope of accomplice liability would be narrowed. State v. Stidham44 could
illustrate a possible effect of this interpretation. The defendant was con-
victed with others of a murder committed on the night of a prison riot.
Several prisoners had broken into the cell of a fellow inmate and inflicted
multiple wounds upon him, killing him. On appeal, the defendant argued
that since there was no evidence that he participated in the killing, he
could not be convicted of murder. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction, holding that no particular physical acts are necessary, but
"mere encouragement is enough in the absence of statutory provisions. '45
If Stidham had been decided under section 562.041, the conviction might
have been reversed, unless the state could have shown some physical act of
participation, or agreement by the defendant to physically participate.
Because there is flexibility in statutory interpretation, section 562.041
may not limit the scope of accomplice liability. Verbal encouragement
could be interpreted to fit within the meaning of the term aid. It is an affir-
mative act, and if it can be proven that this encouragement was the im-
petus to the crime or if the principal could not have committed the offense
but for the encouragement, then it certainly "supported, helped, or
another if: .. .acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the of-
fense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to
commit the offense").
40. It can also be said that the use of the word aid without expansion (such
as inclusion of the term "abet" or reference to common law principals in the
second degree) will broaden the scope of accomplice liability. See discussion in
text accompanying notes 99-109 infra.
41. Hines v. State, 16 Ga. App. 411, 414, 85 S.E. 452, 454 (1915); Cornett v.
Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 236, 239-40, 248 S.W. 540, 542 (1923). See also cases
cited note 28 supra.
42. People v. Terman, 4 Cal. App. 2d 345, 346-47, 40 P.2d 915, 916 (1935).
See also cases cited note 29 supra and note 101 infra.
43. Section 562.041 covers counseling in the commission of the offense by
the use of the term "planning."
44. 305 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1957).
45. Id. at 15.
[Vol. 44
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assisted" the principal. Holding an accomplice liable for murder because
he provided essential moral support is as logically sound as holding him
liable for murder because he provided the murder weapon. Because the
new statute uses the term aid without others, the courts will be called upon
to decide whether it was the legislative intent to impose accomplice liabil-
ity on this basis.
Section 562.041.1(2) also makes an accomplice liable where he merely
"agrees to aid," which rather than physical participation in the offense is
only an agreement to physically participate. This would cover the situa-
tions where the defendant agrees to give aid and is present and ready to
give aid if it becomes necessary, 46 or where he agrees to aid in the commis-
sion of the crime, but for some reason does not do so and fails to make an
effective withdrawal from the offense. 47
C. Attempts to Aid
Aiding the commission of an offense may take a variety of forms, but
the aid given need not actually help the principal perform the criminal
act. Section 562.041.1(2) provides that an accomplice is responsible for the
conduct of another if he "attempts to aid such other person in planning,
committing, or attempting to commit the offense." No Missouri case law
discusses what conduct constitutes an attempt to aid, but it can be
assumed that, as a minimum, an accomplice attempts to give aid when he
takes a substantial step towards giving that aid,48 whether or not successful
in rendering aid.
For example, suppose A learns that a telegram is being sent to warn B
that C is going to kill him. Since A wants C to kill B, A sends another tele-
gram to the telegraph operator, whom he knows, to tell him not to deliver
the first telegram, thus preventing delivery of the warning. 49 The messen-
ger delivers the telegram anyway; A has unsuccessfully tried to aid C. To
send a telegram asking the telegraph operator not to deliver the warning is
a substantial step in attempting to give aid to C. A would be criminally
responsible for the conduct of C and if C kills B, A could also be convicted
46. Cf. State v. Gooch, 105 Mo. 392, 16 S.W. 892, 893 (1891) (affirming the
conviction of an accomplice for assault with intent to kill indicating in dicta that
being present to render aid if necessary might be sufficient to impose accomplice
liability).
47. See State v. Forsha, 190 Mo. 296, 88 S.W. 746 (1905) (affirming a con-
viction of an accomplice for murder in the second degree even though the
accomplice fled the scene of the crime before the fatal shot was fired.)
48. Cf. MO. CRIM. CODE § 564.011 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979) (to be guilty of an at-
tempt crime, a substantial step toward the commission of the offense must be
taken).
49. See State ex rel. Martin v. Tally, 102 Ala. 25, 15 So. 722 (1894). For fur-
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of murder. This provision is patterned after the Model Penal Code which
provides that an attempt to give aid is a basis for liability on the grounds
that "attempted complicity ought to be criminal and to distinguish it from
effective complicity appears unnecessary when the crime has been com-
mitted." 0
Suppose the murder is not committed in the hypothetical above, and
further that C takes a shot at B intending to kill him and misses; C would
be guilty of attempted murder. Under both the Missouri Criminal Code
and the Model Penal Code A would be criminally responsible for the con-
duct of C. Therefore, A also would be guilty of attempted murder. But,
suppose B leaves the country after receiving the warning, before an
attempt to kill him can be made. The Model Penal Code suggests that in
such a case the accomplice would be guilty of an attempt to commit
murder.5 Under the Missouri Criminal Code, there would be no liability
because A is made responsible for the conduct of C. 52 If C made no
substantial step toward killing B, there is no unlawful conduct to impute to
A. A's own conduct is probably not a substantial step toward the commis-
sion of murder, so neither would A be guilty of attempted murder on the
basis of his own conduct.
D. Irresponsible or Innocent Agents
Another basis for accomplice liability is the causing of an irresponsible
or innocent agent to commit a crime. 53 Such an agent could be a mentally
incompetent person, a child, or a dupe. At common law, such an in-
termediary is considered only an instrument; the instigating actor is
regarded as the principal in the first degree if he has the requisite state of
mind. 54
In theory, Missouri's new accomplice liability provision parallels the
common law in this area. It differs only in terminology. For example, sup-
pose A, with intent to injure B's wheat threshing machine, induces C, a
child, to put scrap iron in the wheat to be threshed.5 5 At common law the
50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a)(ii) (1962) ("aids or agrees or attempts
to aid such other person in planning or committing" the offense).
51. Id. § 5.01(3), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
52. MO. CRIM. CODE § 562.041 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
53. Most modern criminal codes deal separately with the two basis of
accomplice liability: accomplice liability by aiding the commission of an offense,
or accomplice liability by causing an innocent or irresponsible agent to commit
an offense. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-2(a) (1973); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. tit. 2 § 7.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1974). In this respect, the Missouri Criminal
Code differs from other state codes because § 562.041, read in conjunction with §
562.046 which precludes certain defenses, is designed to cover both bases for
liability for the conduct of another. Mo. PROPOSED CRIM. CODE § 7.070, Com-
ment (Proposed Final Draft, 1972)
54. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 496-97.
55. State v. McLain, 92 Mo. App. 456 (St. L. 1902).
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conduct of C would be imputed to A as principal in the first degree, and
A's criminal liability would depend upon his own intent to destroy or injure
the machine. 56 The analysis is similar under the 1979 Criminal Code, but
A is not made the principal in the first degree. A aided C, by planning the
offense and by providing the scrap iron, with the purpose of promoting the
property damage and knowing that B's threshing machine would be
damaged as a result. Under sections 562.036 and 562.041, A would be
criminally responsible for C's conduct because of the aid given. If the
damage exceeded $5000, A would be guilty of property damage in the first
degree.5 7 It would be no defense that C lacked criminal capacity.5 8 Both at
common law and under the 1979 Criminal Code the conduct of C is
imputed to A, and A's liability depends upon his own mens rea, without
consideration of the actor's state of mind. Common law only applies this
analysis in the case of an innocent or irresponsible agent.5 9 The 1979
Missouri Criminal Code applies it in all situations of accomplice liability, 60
as previously discussed.
61
IV. MENTAL STATE REQUIRED FOR ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
The former Missouri statute on accomplice liability did not set out the
mental state required to hold a person liable for the conduct of another.62
As a result, the Missouri case law is unclear in its terminology on this
issue. 63 Sections 562.036 and 562.041 of the 1979 Missouri Criminal Code
56. If the defendant caused the iron to be concealed in Thompson's
wheat with the malicious purpose of damaging or destroying Mrs.
Elbacher's separator, knowing that in the natural course of events the
wheat would be run through the separator with the iron in it and thereby
injure the machine, and the injury actually transpired in the manner con-
templated, then it was caused by the defendant and was intentionally
caused by him and he is criminally liable. (emphasis added).
Id. at 462. See also State v. Kramer, 206 Mo. App. 49, 226 S.W. 643 (K.C. 1920).
57. Mo. GRIM. CODE§ 569.100 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
58. Id. § 562.046.
59. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 496-97.
60. For some offenses, such as murder and assault, the 1979 Criminal Code
is designed to eliminate the need of an accomplice liability analysis by including
causation in the statute; therefore the originating actor would be the principal in
the first degree. For example, a person is guilty of capital murder if he "unlawful-
ly, willfully, knowingly, deliberately, and with premeditation kills or causes the
killing of another human being . . ." (emphasis added). Mo. CRIM. CODE §
565.001 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979). See also id. § 565.050 (similarly inculpating one who
causes assault in the first degree).
61. See text accompanying notes 15-26 supra.
62. RSMO § 556.170 (1969).
63. State v. Grebe, 461 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. En Banc 1970) (it is necessary
to find that the defendant had "the intent to encourage and abet the crime com-
mitted."); State v. Gideon, 453 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Mo. 1970) ("There can be no
doubt that in Missouri all who act together with a common intent in the commis-
sion of a crime are equally guilty."); State v. Odbur, 317 Mo. 372, 379-80, 295
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set out guidelines for a complete analysis of the mental state one must have
to be criminally responsible for the conduct of another. Two distinct men-
tal states must be present. An accomplice must have the purpose of pro-
moting the commission of an offense, 64 and he must have the mental state
that is required for the crime of which he is to be convicted. 6 5
A. Purposely Promoting the Commission of an Offense
Section 562.041.1(2) of the 1979 Code provides that a person is
criminally liable for the conduct of another if he aids that person with the
"purpose of promoting the commission of an offense." It is not sufficient
that he merely aids the commission of an offense; he must render the aid
with the intention that a particular criminal course of conduct occur.66 A
S.W. 734, 737 (1927) (this court considered a variety of mental states: "[t]here is
nothing in this to indicate that Shade held [the horses] for the purpose of enabling
Odbur to make the assault," and "there is nothing.., to indicate that Shade had
any knowledge of Odbur's intentions. . ." and "[t]here is nothing in the evidence
indicating that he intended any fatal consequences to Willet. . ."); State v. Or-
rick, 106 Mo. 111, 119, 17 S.W. 176, 177 (1891) (approved instruction which
allowed the jury to find the defendant guilty if the "defendant was then and there
present, willfully, deliberately, premeditatedly, and of his malice aforethought,
aiding and abetting such other person in so shooting and killing said Antis.. .");
State v. Phillips, 24 Mo. 475, 481 (1857) (the aider and abettor "must be present,
aiding and assisting to the felony with a felonious intent."); State v. Sneed, 549
S.W.2d 105, 106 (Mo. App., D. St. L.) ("there must be knowledge of the inten-
tion or purpose to commit the particular crime or of a common purpose as to the
particular offense.").
64. This is consistent with the rule of United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401,
402 (2d Cir. 1938) which held that the defendant must "in some sort associate
himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to
bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed. All the words used...
carry an implication of purposive attitude towards it." The language of Peoni has
been adopted by Missouri courts. See, e.g., State v. Ramsey, 368 S.W.2d 413, 417
(Mo. 1963); State v. Muchnick, 334 S.W.2d 386, 389 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960).
65. Without directly addressing the issue, a few Missouri opinions have
indicated that the accomplice must have the mental state required for the
underlying felony. Rather than analyzing it in these terms, the courts have found
that the accomplice shared a common intent or common purpose with the prin-
cipal, which is the same as finding that the accomplice had the required state of
mind. See State v. Gideon, 453 S.W.2d 938 (Mo. 1970); State v. Gregory, 406
S.W.2d 662 (Mo. 1966); State v. Siekermann, 367 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. 1963); State
v. Slade, 338 S.W.2d 802 (Mo. 1960); State v. Jackson, 519 S.W.2d 551 (Mo.
App., D. St. L. 1975). On the other hand, the cases imply that finding that the
accomplice and the principal did not share a common intent is the same as fin-
ding that the accomplice did not have the state of mind required for the crime.
See State v. Stemmons, 262 S.W. 706 (Mo. 1924); State v. Thompson, 293 Mo.
116, 238 S.W. 786 (1922); State v. Porter, 276 Mo. 387, 207 S.W. 774 (1918);
State v. May, 142 Mo. 135, 43 S.W. 637 (1897); State v. Hickam, 95 Mo. 322, 8
S.W. 252 (1888); State v. Sneed, 549 S.W.2d 105 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
66. E.g., State v. Grebe, 461 S.W.2d 265 (Mo. En Banc 1970); State v. Pre-
sent, 344 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1961); State v. Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 7 (Mo. 1957); State
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person could intentionally aid a course of conduct without having the pur-
pose of promoting the commission of a crime. 6 For example, A sees B and
C fighting. Intending to stop the fight, A pulls them apart, enabling B to
draw a gun to shoot and kill C. A "aided" B in committing the murder.
However, although A intended to pull the two apart, he did not intend to
help B kill C and would not be declared B's accomplice.
In other words, it must be the individual's conscious objective to
engage in that conduct or to cause that result. 68 To render aid knowing
that a crime will be committed is not sufficient to impose liability. 69 Nor is
it enough if the individual recklessly70 or negligently7 renders aid to the
principal actor in the commission of the offense. It must be the individual's
purpose or conscious goal to further that particular course of conduct or
result before accomplice liability can be imposed under the 1979 Missouri
Criminal Code.
Section 562.041.1(2) is ambiguous in the sense that it does not clearly
set forth what course of conduct the accomplice must purposely promote.
The precise language of the statute is "with the purpose of promoting the
commission of an offense." 72 Must he purposely promote the commission
of the offense with which he is charged (strict interpretation), or would the
purpose of promoting any offense suffice (liberal interpretation)? Either
v. Odbur, 317 Mo. 372, 295 S.W. 734 (1927); State v. Muchnick, 334 S.W.2d 386
(St. L. Mo. App. 1960) (all holding that an accomplice must intentionally give
aid).
67. This statement should not be interpreted to mean that an accomplice
could avoid liability because he was unaware that the conduct he was aiding was a
crime. Here, as in other areas of criminal liability, ignorance of the fact that his
acts constituted a crime is no excuse. See Mo. CRIM. CODE § 562.031 (eff. Jan. 1,
1979).
68. Mo. CRIM. CODE § 562.016 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979) ("A person 'acts purpose-
ly', or with purpose, with respect to his conduct or to a result thereof when it is his
conscious object to engage in that conduct or to cause that result").
69. A situation where a person knowingly renders aid is in the case of a gun
dealer who sells a pistol knowing that the purchaser intends to use it in armed rob-
bery. For support of the proposition that aid with mere knowledge is sufficient,
see Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635 (4th Cir. 1940). Missouri has rejected
the idea that mere knowledge that a crime is about to be committed is sufficient
for accomplice liability. See generally cases cited notes 28 & 29 supra.
70. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 510-12. But see
Lewis v. State, 220 Ark. 914, 251 S.W.2d 490 (1952); State v. Di Lorenzo, 138
Conn. 281, 83 A.2d 479 (1951); State v. McVay, 47 R.I. 292, 132 A. 436 (1926);
Eager v. State, 205 Tenn. 156, 325 S.W.2d 815 (1959).
71. The Missouri Supreme Court has judicially rejected the theory that
accomplice liability could be based on criminal negligence. Reversing a convic-
tion of manslaughter, the court stated that "[t]o render a person guilty of
negligent homicide the negligent act which caused the death must have been the
personal act of the party charged and not the act of another [since] there could be
no common design to commit a negligent act." State v. Gartland, 304 Mo. 87,
104, 263 S.W. 165, 170 (1924).
72. MO. CRIM. CODE § 562.041.1(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 1979) (emphasis added).
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interpretation is possible under the 1979 Missouri Criminal Code, and to
illustrate the complexity of both interpretations, it is helpful to analyze
accomplice liability based on a crime of recklessness.73
If this provision is interpreted strictly to mean that he must purposely
promote the commission of the offense with which he is charged, crimes of
recklessness would be excluded from the scope of accomplice liability.
Assume that A and B agiee to drag race through a busy residential
neighborhood. During the course of the race B collides with an oncoming
car, and both B and the driver of the other car are killed. Could A be con-
victed of manslaughter under the accomplice liability theory? Under the
strict interpretation, clearly not. Even though a aided B by participating
in the drag race, he did not have the purpose74 of promoting the death of B
or the other driver. Since this was not a result he purposely tried to bring
about, he could not be convicted of manslaughter on the basis of
accomplice liability. 75 Under this strict interpretation, an accomplice
must intend to aid the particular course of conduct which constitutes the
crime with which he is charged, i.e., the collision and resulting death, in
order to be held liable for manslaughter. He must give aid with the con-
scious objective of furthering a particular end result. It would not be suffi-
cient that the person is aware of, or consciously disregards the possibility
that the conduct might produce such a result; 76 he must intend to produce
such a result in order to be liable for that particular offense under
accomplice liability theory.
In support of the liberal interpretation, that the purpose of promoting
the commission of any offense would be sufficient to impose liability,
Missouri courts have long held that, in certain circumstances, the intent to
commit one crime is sufficient to impose liability for another crime. 77 It is
73. The following analysis would also apply to crimes based on criminal
negligence.
74. "A person 'acts purposely', or with purpose, with respect to his conduct
or to a result thereof when it is his conscious object to engage in that conduct or to
cause that result." MO. CRIM. CODE § 562.016.2 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
75. Accomplice liability in crimes of recklessness or criminal negligence is
usually only an alternative theory of liability. The foregoing analysis, then, has
little effect on existing law, and A, in the drag racing hypothetical, could still be
convicted of involuntary manslaughter without being declared an accomplice of
B. Accomplice liability theory becomes necessary only when the commission of
the crime requires specific enumerated acts and the defendant has not performed
any or all of those acts but has intentionally aided someone who has. Crimes of
recklessness or of criminal negligence do not enumerate specific acts. If A's own
conduct of participating in the drag race was reckless or criminally negligent and
was the legal cause of death, then A is guilty of manslaughter on that basis. W.
LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 11, § 64 at 511. See also Jacobs v. State, 184 So.
2d 711 (Fla. 1966); Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961).
76. See Mo. CRIM. CODE § 562.016.4 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979) (definition of "acts
recklessly").
77. See generally cases cited note 115 infra.
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therefore conceivable that Missouri courts will choose this interpretation.
The impact of choosing the liberal interpretation can be illustrated by the
effect it has on A's liability for manslaughter in the hypothetical above. A's
conscious objective was to engage in the drag race, and since speeding is an
offense, he purposely promoted the commission of an offense. He inten-
tionally aided that conduct by participating, and he had the requisite
mental state by disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk that an
accident would result. Therefore, B's conduct, i.e., the accident, would be
imputed to A who would then be guilty of manslaughter.78
In many respects, the liberal interpretation seems to be the most
logical since B, had he lived, would clearly be guilty of manslaughter. B
did not intend the death of the other driver, but his liability would be bas-
ed upon his reckless conduct. Under the liberal interpretation, A's liability
would also be based ultimately upon his own recklessness. By definition,
an individual does not intend to commit involuntary manslaughter; he
recklessly or negligently causes that result. To require a higher state of
mind for the accomplice than that required for the principal actor in this
situation would seem contrary to the purpose of accomplice liability
theory.
As the foregoing analysis illustrates, the interpretation given to section
562.041.1(2) may be the single most important interpretation of the provi-
sion. The section itself-is ambiguous in this respect. How the courts choose
to interpret this provision will affect not just the application of accomplice
liability in crimes of recklessness and criminal negligence but will impact
on the application of the natural and probable consequence rule" and the
felony murder rule 0 in accomplice liability situations.
B. State of Mind for the Underlying Crime
The analysis does not stop upon finding that the accomplice rendered
aid with the purpose of promoting the commission of an offense. One
could intentionally aid a particular course of conduct with the purpose of
furthering the commission of a crime and still not be declared an
accomplice. Section 562.036 of the 1979 Criminal Code provides that a
person must have the required culpable mental state to be guilty of an of-
fense committed by his conduct or by another person's conduct for which
he is criminally responsible. In other words, the accomplice must have the
required state of mind for the underlying crime. 8'
78. But see State v. Phillips, 24 Mo. 475, 490 (1857) ("Moreover, if the kill-
ing was unintentional on the part of Sullivan Phillips, it is not easy to see how
there could be aiders and abettors to it.") (dictum).
79. See text accompanying notes 113-30 infra.
80. See text accompanying notes 151-61 infra.
81. Cf. State v. Taylor, 70 Vt. 1, 39 A. 447 (1898) (accomplice must have
state of mind for underlying felony). See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTr,
supra note 11, at 506-07.
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To illustrate, it is helpful to return to the case of State v. Hayes.8 2
Defendant Hayes aided Hill in burglarizing a store; but the court held that
neither could be guilty of burglary since Hill, the principal actor, did not
have the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the goods. Suppose,
though, that Hayes had been the principal actor and had entered the store
while Hill waited outside. Hill intentionally aided Hayes in breaking and
entering and Hill had the intent that a crime be committed: However,
since Hill intended to return the goods, Hill did not have the purpose of
permanently depriving the owner of the goods. 83 Without the required
state of mind for the underlying crime, Hill could not be held criminally
responsible for the conduct of Hayes even though Hill intentionally aided
the burglary and theft.8 4
The ramifications of requiring that the accomplice have the required
culpable state of mind for the crime of which he is convicted is significant
in a variety of situations. This requirement makes it possible for the
accomplice and the principal to be convicted of different offenses. For ex-
ample, suppose A and B take C's car for ajoyride without his permission. A
intends to return the car, but B intends to steal it, and in fact does steal it.
A intentionally aided B in taking the car, but he would not be convicted of
stealing as an accomplice since he did not have the purpose of permanently
depriving C of the car. Since A only intended to deprive C temporarily of
the car, A would be convicted of tampering in the second degree85 while B
would be convicted of stealing.8 6
Requiring that the accomplice have the requisite state of mind for the
underlying crime has its greatest impact on crimes that have varying
degrees of culpability. The precise state of mind of the accomplice
becomes most significant where there can be different degrees of the same
offense. Rather than leave this area to judicial interpretation, the drafts-
men of the Code specifically provided in section 562.051 that each person
who is criminally responsible for an offense is guilty only of the degree of
such offense that is compatible with his own state of mind. Two examples
serve to illustrate the effect of this provision.
In example number one, the accomplice is convicted of a lesser degree
of the offense than the principal. A is looking for C, intending to beat him
up, but not intending to seriously injure him. B intends to seriously C
injure C and agrees to help A search for C. A drives the car, and when they
find C, B beats C, severely injuring him. B would be guilty of assault in the
first degree.8 7 A could not be convicted of assault in the first degree unless
82. 105 Mo. 76, 16 S.W. 514 (1898). See text accompanying notes 22-26
supra.
83. MO. CRIM. CODE § 570.030 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
84. See also Wilson v. People, 103 Colo. 441, 87 P.2d 5 (1939).
85. 'MO. CRIM. CODE § 569.090.1(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
86. Id. § 570.030.2(2)(a).
87. Id. § 565.050.
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there is evidence to show that he knowingly caused C serious physical
injury.88 Since A did not intend to seriously injure C, A could not be con-
victed of assault in the first degree, but could be convicted of assault in the
second89 or third" degree.
In example two, the accomplice is convicted of a higher degree of the
offense than is the principal.9 1 Assume that B reasonably believes that C
has raped his wife. Under extreme emotional distress, B looks for C intend-
ing to kill him. A has planned to kill C for some time and agrees to aid B. A
lures C into the alley where B is waiting for him, and B shoots C, killing
him. B would be convicted of manslaughter since B was under the
influence of extreme emotional provocation.92 A would be convicted of
murder in the first93 or second 94 degree since he aided B with a
premeditated intent to kill C.
It is a departure from former Missouri law to hold an accomplice liable
only for the degree of the offense that reflects his culpable state of mind.
The repealed Missouri statute on accomplice liability provided that an
aider and abettor would be charged, tried, convicted and punished in the
same manner as the principal.95 In State v. Tolias,9 6 under a fact situation
similar to example number one above, a conviction of an accomplice for
assault with intent to kill was affirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court
without the court determining whether he had that intent. In the past, in
order to obtain the conviction of an accomplice, the state has had to prove
that the principal had the culpable state of mind required for the crime
charged.9 7 The 1979 Criminal Code now makes it necessary for the state to
88. Id. Cf. State v. Taylor, 70 Vt. 1, 39 A. 447 (1898) (accomplice must
have state of mind for underlying felony). But cf State v. Tolias, 326 S.W.2d 329(Mo. 1959); State v. Chernick, 278 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1955) (both courts affirmed
conviction of accomplice for assault with intent to kill without showing
accomplice had that intent).
89. MO. CRIM. CODE § 565.060 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
90. Id. § 565.070.
91. But cf. State v. Recke, 311 Mo. 581, 278 S.W. 995 (1925) (reversed on
the grounds that a manslaughter instruction should have been given since an
accomplice could not be convicted of a higher degree of homicide than the prin-
cipal). Courts today in Missouri would hold differently under section 562.051
since an accomplice may now be convicted of a higher degree of offense than the
principal.
92. RSMo § 559.070 (1969).
93. RSMo § 559.010 (1969).
94. RSMo § 559.020 (1969).
95. RSMo § 556.170 (1969). See generally cases cited note 13 supra.
96. 326 S.W.2d 329 (Mo. 1959).
97. See, e.g., State v. Hayes, 262 S.W. 1034 (Mo. 1924) (the court stated
that an accomplice is guilty of murder in the same degree as the principal, but to
prove that he was guilty of murder in the first degree it is necessary to show that
the principal committed the crime deliberately, premeditatedly, and with malice
aforethought); State v. Hayes, 105 Mo. 76, 16 S.W. 514 (1891) (held that the
accomplice could not be convicted of burglary and larceny since the principal did
not have felonious intent).
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prove the defendant-accomplice's state of mind, rather than the
principal's.
C. Accomplice's Knowledge of Principal's Criminal Intent
It has already been pointed out that section 562.041 uses the term aid
without abet, encourage, or other words of expansion, and may thereby
limit the scope of accomplice liability by requiring physical participation
on the part of the accomplice. 98 The word abet, however, means more
than just counsel and encouragement. It has been interpreted to mean
that the accomplice must have had knowledge of the wrongful purpose of
the principal. 99 A superficial interpretation could be that the omission of
the term abet from the 1979 Criminal Code also expands liability by
eliminating the requirement that the accomplice know of the principal's
wrongful purpose or intent, 00 and thereby exposes to liability someone
who innocently aids the commission of an offense. Further-analysis in-
dicates that the omission of this requirement is consistent with the
statutory scheme of accomplice liability under the 1979 Code and does not
expose an innocent aider to liability.
In order to examine the practical effect of this omission, it is helpful to
re-analyze a Missouri case which reversed a conviction because there was
evidence neither that the accomplice knew of the wrongful intention of the
principal nor that there was a common purpose or intent among the par-
ties.'1 In State v. Porter,102 the defendant and another man, named Mills,
answered the call of a woman who was alone in an alley with two men. She
was apparently frightened of the two men and asked the defendant if he
would see her home. The defendant and one of the men in the alley began
fighting. During the fight Mills pulled a knife and killed the man with
whom the defendant was fighting. The defendant was convicted of second
degree murder. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that an
instruction in either degree of murder was unauthorized because there was
98. See text accompanying notes 36-45 supra.
99. People v. Terman, 4 Cal. App. 2d 345, 346-47, 40 P.2d 915, 916 (1935).
See also cases cited note 101 infra.
100. See State v. Sears, 296 A.2d 218, 220 (Vt. 1972) ("aiding is a broader
concept than 'aiding and abetting"').
101. It should be noted that normally when Missouri courts have addressed
the issue of whether the accomplice knew of the wrongful purpose of the prin-
cipal, they have also determined whether the accomplice and principal shared a
common purpose or intent, i.e., state of mind for the underlying felony. See note
60 supra. The opinions do not differentiate between the two issues and seem to
treat them synonomously. See generally State v. Stidham, 305 S.W.2d 7 (Mo.
1957); State v. Odbur, 317 Mo. 372, 295 S.W. 734 (1927); State v. Stemmons,
262 S.W. 706 (Mo. 1924); State v. Porter, 276 Mo. 387, 207 S.W. 774 (1918);
State v. Hickam, 95 Mo. 322, 8 S.W. 252 (1888); State v. Sneed, 549 S.W.2d 105
(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
102. 276 Mo. 387, 207 S.W. 774 (1918).
250 [Vol. 44
18
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [1979], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss2/3
ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
no evidence that the defendant knew of Mills' intention or purpose to com-
mit the murder, and because there was no "like criminal intent in the
minds of Mills and the appellant.' ' 0 3 Essentially, the court found that the
defendant, Porter, did not have the intent to commit murder.
Under the 1979 Criminal Code, an accomplice cannot be convicted of
an offense unless he had the state of mind required for that offense. 04
Therefore, the result in Porter would be the same under the new Code,
even though it would not be necessary for liability that Porter know of
Mills' wrongful intention. Likewise, a person who is unaware of the
wrongful purpose of the principal actor and who innocently aids him to
commit a crime is not liable since the innocent aider lacks the requisite
state of mind for the underlying felony. The 1979 Code makes the prin-
cipal's state of mind and the accomplice's knowledge of it irrelevant to the
inquiry, for once the state proves that the principal actor engaged in the
criminal conduct, it will not matter whether the principal actor is guilty of
the crime or not. After the state proves that the principal committed the
conduct of the crime, it must then prove that the accomplice is criminally
responsible for this conduct. 105 To do this, the state must show that either
before or during the commission of the crime, the accomplice aided,
attempted or agreed to aid the principal in planning, committing or at-
tempting to commit the offense. 0 6 The aid must be some form of affir-
mative participation, and it must be intentional with the purpose of pro-
moting the commission of an offense.' 07 Finally, the state must offer
evidence to show that the accomplice had the state of mind required for
the crime. 108 The degree of the offense of which he may be convicted
depends upon his own guilt and not upon the guilt of the principal. 10 9
V. THE LIMITS OF ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
The limits of accomplice liability were previously defined by the
judiciary in Missouri. The 1979 Criminal Code sets statutory limits on
imposing criminal responsibility for the conduct of another and changes
some well-settled principles of Missouri law. For instance, the application
of the natural and probable consequence rule is modified, if not totally
abrogated, by the new provision. Application of the felony murder rule in
accomplice liability may also be abrogated. Certain defenses that were
available at common law have been precluded. 01 Withdrawal is now an
affirmative defense, I" and certain persons are specifically exempted from
103. Id. at 394, 207 S.W. at 776.
104. MO. CRIM. CODE § 562.036 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
105. Id. § 562.041.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. § 562.036.
109. Id. § 562.051.
110. Id. § 562.046.
111. Id. § 562.041.2(3).
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accomplice liability.1 2 The basic principles of accomplice liability have
already been set out and discussed in detail. An examination of the limits
of accomplice liability is an exercise in applying those basic principles.
A. Natural and Probable Consequence Rule
The natural and probable consequence rule tests the outer limits of the
mental state required to hold one person responsible for the conduct of
another person.11 3 The rule provides that an accomplice is liable for all
crimes committed by a co-felon that are a natural and probable conse-
quence of the intended offense; it is similar to the felony murder rule,
except that it applies to all crimes.11 4 Missouri applies the natural and pro-
bable consequence rule, " 5 but the 1979 provisions on accomplice liability
will either modify application of the rule or abrogate it altogether. This
depends upon how the courts interpret the provision that the accomplice
must have the purpose of promoting the commission of an offense. 1 6 If it is
interpreted to mean that he must purposely promote the commission of
the crime with which he is charged (strict interpretation), the natural and
probable consequence rule will no longer be applicable because the ac-
complice would only have the conscious objective of promoting the intend-
ed offense, and the fact that the offense charged is a natural and probable
consequence of the intended offense would not be sufficient to impose
liability. If it is interpreted to mean that the purpose of promoting any of-
fense is sufficient to impose liability (liberal interpretation), the rule will
still be applicable, but greatly modified because the accomplice will still be
112. Id. § 562.041.2(1) and (2).
113. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 515.
114. Id.
115. State v. Paxton, 453 S.W.2d 923 (Mo. 1970) (accomplice convicted of
first degree murder committed by co-felon during robbery; natural and probable
consequence rule discussed in dicta, felony murder rule applied); State v. Tolias,
326 S.W.2d 329 (Mo. 1959) (accomplice convicted of assault with intent to kill
committed by co-felon); State v. Chernick, 278 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1955) (ac-
complice convicted of assault with intent to kill committed by co-felon during
robbery); State v. Recke, 311 Mo. 581, 278 S.W. 995 (1925) (defendant convicted
of murder committed by men he sent to persuade non-union members to stay off
a job); State v. Hayes, 262 S.W. 1034 (Mo. 1924)(defendant convicted of murder
cdmmitted by person he hired to assault victim); State v. Darling, 216 Mo. 450,
115 S.W. 1002 (1909) (accomplice convicted of manslaughter committed by co-
felon during assault); State v. Williams, 522 S.W.2d 327 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1975) (felony murder in connection with robbery; natural and probable conse-
quence rule discussed in dicta).
116. MO. GRIM. CODE § 562.041.1(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 1979) ("A person is crim-
inally responsible for the conduct of another when... (2) Either before or during
the commission of an offense with the purpose of promoting the commission of an
offense, he aids or agrees to aid or attempts to aid such other person in planning,
committing or attempting to commit the offense.") (emphasis added).
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required to have the state of mind necessary for the offense with which he is
charged.1 7 In order to fully understand this analysis, it is helpful to re-
examine, under both interpretations, a Missouri case dealing with the
natural and probable consequence rule.
In State v. Chernick"18 the defendant and two companions robbed a
bank. The defendant was the driver of the getaway car and did not enter
the bank. During the course of the robbery, one of his companions shot
and wounded a policeman. The Missouri Supreme Court observed that the
defendant could be convicted of assault with intent to kill because assault
with intent to kill was the natural and probable consequence of armed rob-
bery." 9 If a court accepts the strict interpretation that the accomplice
must purposely promote the commission of the offense for which he is
charged, Chernick could not be convicted of assault with intent to kill on
an accomplice liability theory unless he had the intent to kill and purposely
promoted the assault.
If Chernick had agreed with his co-felops prior to the robbery that they
would "shoot it out if necessary," it could be argued that he purposely pro-
moted the assault with the intent to kill, and could therefore be convicted
of assault in the first degree 20 under an accomplice liability theory. If
there was no agreement, express or implied, then the most that can be said
is that Chernick consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that an assault would result from the armed robbery.12' In other
words, he purposely promoted the robbery, and he recklessly promoted the
assault, which is not sufficient under this strict interpretation to convict
him of assault in the first degree under an accomplice liability theory. 22 If
the Missouri courts adopt this interpretation of section 562.041.1(2), the
natural and probable consequence rule must be abandoned; the inquiry
will turn upon whether or not the accomplice purposely promoted the
resulting offense with the required culpable state of mind and not upon
whether it was the natural and probable consequence of the intended
offense.
117. Id. § 562.036.
118. 278 S.W.2d 741 (Mo. 1955).
119. Id. at 746 (the conviction was reversed on other grounds). Assault with
intent to kill is assault in the first degree under the 1979 Code. Mo. CRIM. CODE §
565.050 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
120. MO. CRIM. CODE § 565.050 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
121. Id. § 562.016.4.
122. This does not mean to suggest that Chernick could not be convicted of
assault on the basis of his own conduct, rather than by applying an accomplice
libility theory. Section 565.060.1(2) of the 1979 Missouri Criminal Code provides
that a person is guilty of assault in the second degree if he recklessly causes serious
physical injury to another person. If Chernick's own conduct in taking part in the
robbery, knowing that his companions were armed, is considered to be reckless
and a legal cause of the assault, Chernick could be convicted of assault in the
second degree on the basis of his own conduct, rather than the conduct of another
person. See also note 75 supra.
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If the liberal interpretation of section 562.041.1(2) is adopted by the
Missouri courts, i.e., that the purpose to promote any offense will be suffi-
cient to impose liability, the natural and probable consequence rule will
still be valid, but its use will be limited. In Chernick, the defendant inten-
tionally aided the robbery with the purpose of promoting the robbery and
with the purpose of forcibly stealing another's property. Therefore, the
defendant is criminally responsible for the conduct which constituted the
robbery commited by his co-felons.1 23 It is clear that he can be convicted of
robbery, even though he did not commit the acts of stealing. But, can he
be convicted of assault with the intent to kill? By driving the getaway car,
he intentionally aided the robbery, and it can be argued that this also aid-
ed the assault since assault is the natural and probable consequence of
armed robbery. He also had the purpose of promoting the commission of
an offense, i.e., the robbery. He is therefore under the liberal interpreta-
tion criminally responsible for the conduct which constituted the assault
committed by his co-felons. 124 This is only half of the problem-he must
also have the culpable mental state required for assault,1 25 and then he is
only guilty of the degree of assault that is compatible with his own state of
mind.' 26 If there was a prior agreement to "shoot it out if necessary," then
it may be argued he had the intent to kill and could be convicted of assault
in the first degree. If there was no prior agreement, but if he knew that his
co-felons had guns, he may be reckless or criminally negligent as to the
shoot-out during the robbery and may be convicted of assault in the
second' 27 or third' 28 degree. It is also likely that the accomplice may not
have the required culpable state of mind for any degree of assault, and a
conviction would not be upheld.
Thus, the natural and probable consequence rule is limited by the
1979 Criminal Code, even if the liberal interpretation of section
562.041.1(2) is adopted. The offense charged must still be the natural and
probable consequence of the intended offense, 129 and this conduct can still
be imputed to an accomplice if all of the other requirements are met. The
liability of the accomplice will nonetheless ultimately be determined by his
own culpability with regard to the offense charged and not to the offense
intended.' 30 The practical effect of this will be to severely limit the use of
the natural and probable consequence rule.
123. MO. CRIM. CODE § 562.041 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
124. Id.
125. Id. § 562.036.
126. Id. § 562.051.
127. Id. § 565.060.
128. Id. § 565.070.
129. See State v. Thompson, 293 Mo. 116, 238 S.W. 786 (1922); State v.
Sneed, 549 S.W.2d 105 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
130. Under the first interpretation of§ 562.041.1(2), as discussed in notes 75
and 122 supra, the accomplice may still be convicted of a degree of the resulting
offense if by his own conduct he was reckless or criminally negligent as to that
[Vol. 44254
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Because Missouri courts will be faced with a choice of adopting either
an interpretation which would abrogate the natural and probable conse-
quence rule or one that would retain it in modified form, it may be helpful
to examine what other jurisdictions have decided on this issue.
The Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Kessler'3 1 confronted the
question of whether Illinois' recently adopted accomplice liability
statute, 1 32 which is similar to Missouri's, abrogated or modified the com-
mon design principle. This principle is Illinois' equivalent of the natural
and probable consequence rule. In Kessler, the defendant was tried and
convicted of burglary and attempted murder. During the course of the
burglary, defendant's companions shot at the owner of the tavern and dur-
ing the escape shot at several policemen. The question on appeal was
whether the application of the common design principle under the statute
was appropriate to hold a defendant accountable for attempted murder, a
crime which was committed by someone else and which the defendant did
not intend. Affirming the conviction and upholding the application of the
common design principle, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the word
"conduct" in the statute encompasses any criminal act done in furtherance
of the planned and intended act. 1 33
Although the Missouri and Illinois statutes are similar, there are
several important differences that would preclude a Missouri court from
reaching the same conclusion under an identical set of facts. First, Illinois
has statutorily defined the term conduct as "an act or a series of acts, and
the accompanying mental state"'3 4 (emphasis added). Missouri has not
statutorily defined the term, so one may assume that the term as used in
the statute was intended to have its ordinary meaning. Conduct is defined
as "personal behavior, deportment, mode of action, any positive or
negative act."' 35 It does not imply a mental state.
Second, and most important, is the difference in the two statutes
themselves. The Illinois statute provides that "[a] person is responsible for
conduct which is an element of an offense if the conduct is either that of
the person himself, or that of another and he is legally accountable for
such conduct. .... ",13 The equivalent Missouri statute provides that "[a]
result. Practically speaking, this is the same result reached under this second in-
terpretation of section 562.041.1(2), because the accomplice's own state of mind
determines his culpability. The difference lies in the analysis. Under the first in-
terpretation of § 562.041.1(2), accomplice liability would not apply at all, but he
could be convicted on the basis of his own conduct. In the second interpretation,
accomplice liability would apply and he could be convicted on the basis of his
criminal responsibility for the conduct of another person.
131. 57 Ill. 2d 493, 315 N.E.2d 29, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1.054 (1974).
132. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-2 (1973).
133. 57 Ill. 2d at 497, 315 N.E.2d at 32.
134. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 2-4 (1973).
135. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 367 (4th ed. 1968).
136. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 5-1 (1973).
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person with the required culpable mental state is guilty of an offense if it is
committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for
which he is criminally responsible .... -137 As a condition precedent to
accountability, Missouri specifically requires the defendant to have the
culpable state of mind for the underlying felony. 138 On the facts of People
v. Kessler and under either interpretation of section 562.041.1(2) of the
1979 Criminal Code, Missouri could not automatically apply the natural
and probable consequence rule to hold the defendant in this case guilty of
attempted murder. In Missouri, even under the liberal interpretation, the
state would at least have to prove that he intentionally aided and promoted
conduct 39 that was a substantial step in the commission of a crime, 140 and
that he had the intent to commit murder. ' 4
Some states have avoided the problems of judicial interpretation by
specifically including a provision which provides an accomplice can be
held liable for all the crimes that are a result of the intended offense.' 42
The Missouri legislature failed to do this, and by wording the statute as it
did, it can be inferred that the legislative intent was to at least modify, if
not eliminate, the natural and probable consequence rule.
The natural and probable consequence rule has been criticized as in-
consistent with the fundamental principles of our criminal justice
system. ' 43 Application of this rule results in liability being predicated upon
negligence where the crime involved requires a different state of mind.144
Because this would not be possible for one who has personally committed
the crime, it should not apply to accomplice liability either.14' For exam-
137. Mo. CRIM. CODE § 562.036 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979) (emphasis added).
138. Id.
139. Id. § 562.041.
140. Id. § 564.011.
141. Id. § 562.036.
142. KAN. STAT. § 21-3205(2) (1974) (a person criminally responsible for
crimes of another "is also liable for any other crime committed in pursuance of
the intended crime if reasonably foreseeable by him as a probable consequence of
committing or attempting to commit the crime intended"); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
609.05 (West 1964) (same as Kansas); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.05 (West 1977) (a
person criminally responsible for crimes of another on conspiracy or procuring
basis "is also concerned in the commission of any other crime which is committed
in pursuance of the intended crime and which under the circumstances is a
natural and probable consequence of the intended crime").
143. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 516.
144. Id. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3), Comment (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1953) ("Probabilities have an important evidential bearing on these issues; to
make them independently sufficient is to predicate the liability on negligence
when, f6r good reason, more is normally required before liability is found.").
145. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 516. "[W]hile a defendant
can be convicted when he has both the mens rea and commits the actus reus re-
quired for a given offense, he cannot be convicted if the mens rea related to one
crime and the actus reus to another." Id. at 243. See also G. WILLIAMS,
CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 174 (2d ed. 1961).
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ple, the intent to commit one crime cannot be substituted for the intent to
commit another.1 46 If C lights a candle to aid in a theft and as a result
burns the premises, -C's intent to steal would not sustain a conviction of ar-
son; it would be necessary to show that C knowingly started the fire.147
Therefore, application of the natural and probable consequence rule
should not justify holding an accomplice liable for one crime just because
it was a foreseeable result of another crime he intended to commit.148
Following this reasoning, the purpose of promoting one crime should not
be substituted for the purpose of promoting another, and the proper inter-
pretation of section 562.041.1(2) would be that the accomplice must pur-
posely promote the crime with which he is charged.
However, it should be noted that either interpretation of section
562.041.1(2) would eliminate the conceptual inconsistencies of the natural
and probable consequence rule. Even if the statute is interpreted to mean
that the purpose of promoting one crime can be substituted for the pur-
pose of promoting another, 1 49 the accomplice must still have the required
culpable state of mind necessary for the conviction of that offense under
the 1979 Criminal Code.5 0 Therefore, even if the purpose of promoting
one crime would be substituted for the purpose of promoting another, the
intent to commit one crime would not be substituted for the intent to com-
mit another, and this objection to the natural and probable consequence
rule would be eliminated.
B. Felony Murder Rule
Because the felony murder rule in accomplice liability cases is a special
application of the natural and probable consequence rule, 151 it is necessary
to discuss how it may be affected by the new Code. Unlike the natural and
probable consequence rule, in Missouri the felony murder rule is statutory.
It essentially provides that a person who unlawfully kills another person,
146. W. LAFAVE& A. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 516. See also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.03(2), (3) (1962), which provides that the element of purposely or know-
ingly causing a particular result is not established when the actual result is not
within the purpose or contemplation of the actor, and that the element of
recklessly or negligently causing a particular result is not established when the ac-
tual result is not within the risk of which the actor is or should be aware; both pro-
visions have limited exceptions.
147. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 516. See also Regina v.
Faulkner, 13 Cox Crim. Cas. 550 (1877).
148. W. LAFAVE& A. SCOTT, supra note 11, at 516-17.
149. This is another way of stating the second proposed interpretation of sec-
tion 562.041(2)-that the purpose of promoting any offense would be sufficient
to impose liability for the offense charged. See text accompanying notes 72-73
supra.
150. MO. CRIM. CODE § 562.036 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
151. See State v. Paxton, 453 S.W.2d 923 (Mo. 1970); State v. Williams, 522
S.W.2d 327 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
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without premeditated intent to cause that death, is guilty of first degree
murder if the killing is committed in the perpetration of arson, rape, rob-
bery, burglary, or kidnapping. 152
The theory of the felony murder rule has been extended to convict of
first degree murder an accomplice to one of the enumerated felonies. 53
For example, if A aids B in robbing a tavern and B shoots and kills C dur-
ing the course of the robbery, A could also be convicted of first degree
murder under the felony murder rule and accomplice liability theory.15 4
The 1979 Criminal Code supplies an analytical framework within which
the Missouri courts would have the option to either abrogate or retain this
application of the felony murder rule in an accomplice liability situation,
depending upon how the courts interpret section 562.041.1(2), i.e., "the
purpose of promoting the commission of an offense."
It is helpful to examine the legislative history of section 562.041.1(1).
This subsection provides that a person is criminally responsible for the con-
duct of another person when "[t]he statute defining the offense makes him
so responsible."'' -5 This subsection broadens the scope of accomplice liabil-
ity by allowing the legislature to pass statutes which create greater liability
for an accomplice. In the 1972 Proposed Draft, this subsection was utilized
in the drafting of the felony murder rule, which specifically made an ac-
complice liable for felony murder committed during the commission of
arson, rape, robbery, burglary, or kidnapping. 5 6 In the final draft, how-
ever, this provision was omitted from the felony murder rule. 5 7 Because
subsection 562.041.1(1) was adopted by the legislature, it can be assumed
that if a particular statute does not specifically provide for criminal
responsibility of an accomplice, liability is subject to the interpretation
and principles of the general accomplice liability provisions. Since the
felony murder rule does not contain a provision that makes an accomplice
liable for any killing committed during one of the enumerated felonies, it
would be subject to these rules.
The analysis for felony murder would be identical to the analysis for
the natural and probable consequence rule. 58 The result depends upon
how the courts interpret section 562.041.1(2). If it is interpreted to mean
that the accomplice must purposely promote the commission of the offense
with which he is charged (strict interpretation), the felony murder rule will
no longer be applicable in accomplice liability theory, unless the state can
show that the accomplice purposely aided or promoted the death. On the
other hand, if it is interpreted to mean that the purpose of promoting any
152. Mo. CRIM. CODE § 565.003 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
153. See, e.g., State v. Paxton, 453 S.W.2d 923 (Mo. 1970).
154. Id.
155. MO. CRIM. CODE § 562.041.1(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
156. Mo. PROPOSED CRIM. CODE § 10.020(1)(d) (1973).
157. MO. CRIM. CODE § 565.003 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
158. See text accompanying notes 118-30 supra.
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offense is sufficient to impose liability (liberal interpretation), the felony
murder rule's application in accomplice situations will be preserved intact.
To illustrate how the felony murder rule as applied in accomplice
liability would be retained under the liberal interpretation, it is helpful to
go through a complete analysis. Suppose A helps B plan the robbery of a
tavern. While A buys beer to draw the attention of the employee, B goes to
the back of the tavern to rob the owner. During the course of the robbery,
B shoots and kills the owner. 59 Clearly, B could be convicted of first
degree murder under the felony murder rule.160 The question is, can A? A
intentionally aided B plan the robbery with the purpose of promoting the
commission of an offense, i.e., the robbery. Under section 562.041, A
would be criminally responsible for the conduct of B, but normally he
must still have the required culpable state of mind for the crime of which
he is convicted, here first degree murder. 6 However, section 565.003 of
the 1979 Criminal Code specifically provides that a person may be con-
victed under the felony murder rule of first degree murder without a
premeditated intent to cause the death of that particular individual.
Because a premeditated intent is not required, and since under section
562.041 A is criminally responsible for B's conduct, A could be convicted
of first degree murder under the felony murder rule if the courts accept the
liberal interpretation. Therefore, the interpretation given to section
562.041.1(2) will be determinative of whether the felony murder rule will
be altered in accomplice liability theory.
C. Defenses Precluded
1. Acquittal of Principal
It is generally accepted that an accomplice may be convicted notwith-
standing the fact that the principal has not been convicted or has been ac-
quitted.162 The Missouri Supreme Court held in State v. Phillips16 3 that an
acquittal of the principal in the first degree did not operate to discharge an
aider and abettor. The court stated that since there was no longer any
distinction between the different types of parties, all were principals and as
long as the murder was proved it was irrelevant who actually did the act. 6 4
Section 562.046(1) codifies the common law by providing that it is no
defense for an accomplice that the principal has been acquitted or has not
been convicted. 16- But, regardless of whether the principal has been con-
159. See State v. Paxton, 453 S.W.2d 923 (Mo. 1970).
160. Mo. GRIM. CODE§ 565.003 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
161. Id. § 562.036.
162. State v. Phillips, 24 Mo. 475 (1857); State v. Ostman, 147 Mo. App.
422, 126 S.W. 961"(St. L. 1910); Sirigletary v. State, 509 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.'Ct.
App. 1974).
163. 24 Mo. 475 (1857).
164. Id. at 483.
165. Mo. CRIM. CODE § 562.046(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
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victed or acquitted, the act of the principal must still be proved as part of
the evidence against the accomplice.'6 6 At common law this meant that
the principal must have committed the material elements of the crime with
the culpable state of mind required for each element. 167 In some instances
it was a defense for an accomplice if the principal did not have the re-
quisite culpability for the crime. State v. Hayes, 6 8 which has already been
discussed at length,' 69 serves as an excellent example.
2. Non-Culpable Mental State of Principal
The Missouri Supreme Court held in Hayes that an accomplice could
not be held liable if the principal was not acting with felonious intent.
Under the 1979 Code, the principal's state of mind is irrelevant because
only the principal's conduct is imputed to the accomplice. 70 The convic-
tion in Hayes would be upheld if the Code analysis were applied, because
the criminal acts had been completed. 17' It is therefore no longer a defense
under the 1979 Criminal Code that the principal was not acting with the
required culpable state of mind.
This result seems to be the most logical in light of the fact that the 1979
Code has specifically precluded an accomplice from defending on the
grounds of other personal defenses of the principal.' 72 By statutorily pre-
cluding these defenses, the drafters of the Code reinforced the proposition
that the principal's state of mind should have no bearing on the guilt or in-
nocence of an accomplice, whose guilt should be dependent solely upon his
own culpability.
However, the statute contains an incongruity which deserves mention
and which can best be illustrated by the following example. Suppose that
C instigates a fight between himself and B, and B reasonably believes that
C is going to kill him. During the fight, A renders aid to B with the inten-
tion of trying to kill C. In self defense, B kills C. B would not be guilty of
any degree of homicide because he acted in self defense. It is not as clear
whether the 1979 Code would impose liability on A for C's death in this
situation. A aided B with the purpose of promoting the commission of an
166. See generally cases cited note 162 supra.
167. State v. Hayes, 105 Mo. 76, 16 S.W. 514 (1891). See also State v. Hayes,
262 S.W. 1034 (Mo. 1924).
168. 105 Mo. 76, 16 S.W. 514 (1891).
169. See text accompanying notes 22-26 and 82-86 supra.
170. MO. CRIM. CODE § 562.041 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
171. But see State v. Lourie, 12 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. 1928) and its companion
case, State v. Davis, 319 Mo. 1222, 6 S.W.2d 609 (En Banc 1928). The defen-
dant, Davis, and his paramour, Alberdinia Lourie, hired a police undercover
agent to kill Lourie's husband. The policeman went to the victim's home, accor-
ding to plan, but had no intention of killing him. The Missouri Supreme Court
reversed both convictions of attempted murder on the grounds that no overt act
towards the commission of the crime had been completed.
172. MO. CRIM. CODE § 562.046 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
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offense and with a premeditated intent to kill C. Therefore, under the
Code, A would be criminally responsible for the conduct of B, 17 3 and since
personal defenses of the principal actor are precluded from the accom-
plice, 74 A could not defend on grounds of self defense.
The problem with this analysis lies in the precise language of section
562.041.1(2) which provides that the accomplice must aid or agree to aid
or attempt to aid "such other person in planning, committing or attempt-
ing to commit the offense." There was no offense committed in this situa-
tion because B was justified in killing C on the theory of self defense. 175
Therefore, if greater emphasis is placed upon the offense provision of the
statute than upon the provision that makes an accomplice responsible for
the conduct of the principal, A would not be liable for the death of C since
B committed no offense. Yet, A is as culpable in this situation as he would
be in a situation where the principal actor intended to kill C, and a distinc-
tion between the two situations seems artificial.
The analysis which protects A also runs afoul of the entire statutory
scheme of the 1979 Code which bases liability on personal culpability
rather than on the culpability of a third person. 176 In this situation, A's
liability would be mitigated on the basis of B's state of mind, rather than
his own. It should also be noted that section 562.046, which precludes cer-
tain defenses, contains a catch-all provision that precludes the defense
that the principal actor is not amenable to justice. This could be inter-
preted to mean that since B acted in self defense, he is not amenable to
justice, and A would be statutorily precluded from defending on this
ground. Therefore, the more logical interpretation would be that the ac-
complice is responsible for the conduct of the principal actor, and the
word "offense" as used in the statute does not provide a loophole through
which an accomplice may avoid punishment in this situation. This would
be consistent with the principal of imposing liability based on individual
culpability.
3. Conviction of Principal for Different Offense
The 1979 Missouri Criminal Code provides that when two or more per-
sons are criminally responsible for an offense, each person is guilty of the
degree of that offense as is compatible with his own culpable mental
state, 177 and it is no defense to an accomplice that the principal has been
convicted of some other degree of the offense. 178 Both sides of this issue
173. MO. CRIM. CODE § 562.041 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
174. Id. § 562.046.
175. W. LAFAVE & A. ScOTT, supra note 11, at 391. "His intentional inflic-
tion of... physical harm upon the other.., is said to be justified when he acts in
proper self-defense, so that he is not guilty of any crime."
176. See text accompanying notes 81-97 supra.
177. Mo. CRIM. CODE § 562.051 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
178. Id. § 562.046.
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were examined in Reece v. State,'7 9 in which the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals interpreted a statute 80 similar to Missouri's. The principal was
convicted of aggravated robbery and the accomplice was convicted of sim-
ple robbery. The principal argued on appeal that he could not be con-
victed of aggravated robbery since the jury had found his accomplice
guilty of only simple robbery, thereby determining that no deadly weapon
had been used. The accomplice argued for a reversal on the grounds that
since the principal had been found guilty of aggravated robbery, he
himself could only be guilty of aggravated robbery since his criminal
responsibility was derived from the conduct of the principal. The court
held that nothing in this statute precluded the jury from finding one
defendant guilty of a lesser included offense and another guilty of the
greater offense, a result also appropriate under the new Missouri Criminal
Code.
4. Principal's Lack of Capacity or Knowledge
Other defenses are also precluded under the 1979 Code. For instance,
it is no defense to an accomplice if the principal lacked criminal capacity
or was unaware of the accomplice's criminal purpose. 18' These two provi-
sions are designed to cover the case of an irresponsible or innocent
agent.'8 2 The former would also include the situation where the principal
is not the agent of the accomplice, but nevertheless is legally incapable of
criminal activity. 8 3 The provision that the principal need not be aware of
the accomplice's criminal purpose may go beyond the case of an innocent
agent, and may also be interpreted to include the situation where the prin-
cipal is not even aware of the accomplice's aid. 184
5. Principal's Immunity From Prosecution or
Lack of Capacity to Commit Offense
It is not a defense if the principal is immune from prosecution. 85 For
example, this would cover the situation where the principal had
diplomatic immunity. The fact that the principal is not amenable to
justice would not be a defense for an accomplice.' 86 This provision is suffi-
ciently vague to cover a variety of situations and may serve as a catch-all
179. 521 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
180. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 7.03 (Vernon 1974).
181. Mo. CRIM. CODE § 562.046 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
182. See text accompanying notes 53-61 supra.
183. Mo. CRIM. CODE §§ 562.081 and 562.086 (infancy and lack of respon-
sibility because of mental disease or defect).
184. But cf. Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442 (1893) (an uncom-
municated intent to give aid is insufficient to render one an accomplice).
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provision. It could cover the case of State v. Hayes8 7 where the principal
lacked the culpable state of mind for burglary. It would also cover the case
of an innocent agent, or almost any situation where the principal could not.
be convicted of the crime.
There are some crimes that by statutory definition can only be com-
mitted by a certain class of persons. Rape, for example, can only be com-
mitted by a person not married to the victim.18 8 A wife or husband could
not be convicted of personally raping his or her own spouse. The crime of
incest can only be committed by two people of a certain degree of relation-
ship to each other. 189 Only a public servant could personally commit the
crimes of official misconduct, 190 acceding to corruption, 19' or misconduct
in the administration of justice. 92 It is nonetheless possible that someone
who did not personally commit these crimes could be convicted of them as
an accomplice. Section 562.046(2) provides that in a prosecution for an
offense in which the criminal responsibility of the defendant is based on
the conduct of another it is no defense that the defendant does not belong
to that class of persons legally capable of committing the offense in an in-
dividual capacity. This section codifies Missouri case law. In State v.
Drope, 193 A helped B, C, and D rape his wife by tying her down to the bed.
The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of rape based on ac-
complice liability theory even though the defendant could not have com-
mitted the crime of rape against his own wife absent the activity of B, C,
and D.
For an accomplice to be convicted, it is necessary for the principal to
belong to the class of persons who are legally capable of committing the
offense. The Missouri Supreme Court addressed the issue in State v.
Baker. 94 The defendant was charged as an accessory to concealing a birth
in aiding her husband to secretly bury their daughter's newborn child.
Their daughter, the mother of the child, took no part in the burial. Under
the applicable statute, only the mother of the child could have been the
principal in the first degree. The court held that since there was no prin-
cipal, there could be no accessory. Presumably, it would still be a defense
for an accomplice if the principal actor did not belong to the class of per-
sons legally capable of committing the offense in an individual capacity,
although it is possible to analyze this situation under the 1979 Code as
imposing liablity on the accomplice. Because the principal actor does not
187. 105 Mo. 76, 16 S.W. 514 (1891). See also text accompanying notes
22-26, 82-86, & 167-69 supra.
188. MO. CRIM. CODE § 566.030 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
189. Id. § 568.020.
190. Id. § 576.040.
191. Id. § 576.020.
192. Id. § 575.320.
193. 462 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. 1971).
194. 297 Mo. 249, 248 S.W. 956 (1923).
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belong to the class of persons legally capable of committing the offense in
an individual capacity, he is not amenable to justice.' 95 Under section
562.046, an accomplice could not raise the defense that the principal was
not amenable to justice, and the accomplice could then be held liable. The
courts will eventually be called upon to decide if the new Criminal Code
has legislatively overruled Baker.
D. Exceptions to Accomplice Liability
There are some exceptions to the general principles that a person who
aids the commission of an offense is guilty as an accomplice. Section
562.041.2(a) exempts the victim of the offense from accomplice liability,
even though his conduct assisted in the commission of the crime. The
rationale is that, "[t]he business man who yields to the extortion of a
racketeer, the parent who pays ransom to the kidnapper, may be unwise or
even may be thought immoral; to view them as involved in the commission
of the crime confounds the policy embodied in the prohibition."'196 Willing
or consenting victims would also be excluded from the scope of accomplice
liability. 197
Section 562.041.2(b) exempts a person whose conduct is necessarily in-
cident to the commission of the offense. Unless otherwise specified in the
statute defining the offense, this subsection extends protection to persons
who do not fall neatly into the category of victims.198 Exemptions would in-
clude a purchaser in an illegal sale,' 99 the unmarried participant in a
charge of adultery, 200 or the patron of a prostitute. 20' Section 562.041.2(b)
further provides that if the incidental conduct constitutes a related but
separate offense, the party is criminally responsible for that offense, but
not for the conduct or offense committed or attempted by the principal ac-
tor. In the above example, a patron of a prostitute could not be held guilty
of prostitution 20 2 based on accomplice liability, but under the 1979 Code
he would be guilty of the support crime of patronizing prostitution. 203 The
prostitute would not be guilty of patronizing prostitution under the ac-
complice liability principles. Each individual would be criminally respon-
sible only for his or her own conduct in this type of situation.
195. MO. CRIM. CODE § 562.046 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
196. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).
197. Cf. Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (1932) (consenting victim in
a violation of the Mann Act); Regina v. Tyrell, 17 Cox Crim. Cas. 716 (1893) (vic-
tim in statutory rape).
198. MO. PROPOSED CRIM. CODE § 7.070, Comment (1973).
199. See United States v. Farrar, 281 U.S. 624 (1930).
200. See Ex parte Cooper, 162 Cal. 81, 121 P. 318 (1912).
201. See People v. Anonymous, 161 Misc. 379, 292 N.Y.S. 282 (1936).
202.' Mo. CRIM. CODE § 567.020 (eff. Jan. 1, 1979).
203. Id. § 567.030.
[Vol. 44264
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Applicability of these exclusions is a matter of statutory interpretation.
For example, Ex parte Cooper2 0 4 held that an unmarried woman could not.
be an aider and abettor to the crime of adultery because of the inap-
plicability of the statute to unmarried persons. The court indicated that
the result would be otherwise if there were a statutory provision which in-
cluded unmarried persons.2 0 5 These subsections do not prevent such per-
sons from being criminally liable, they only require that the statute defin-
ing the offense specifically include them.2 0 6
E. Withdrawal
Under certain circumstances, after an accomplice has agreed to aid or
has rendered aid, he may escape liability if he withdraws from the commis-
sion of the offense. Prior Missouri statutes did not provide for an oppor-
tunity to escape liability after aid had been given. 207 Missouri judicially
recognized the defense, 208 but there is little case law on the subject.
Section 562.041.2(c) provides that withdrawl is an affirmative defense
if before the commission of the offense the person who rendered aid aban-
dons his purpose and gives timely warning to law enforcement authorities
or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the crime.
This subsection provides an affirmative defense only when there has been
some effort to prevent the crime, and the crime has been committed in
spite of the preventive effort.2 0 9 The burden of injecting the issue and the
burden of persuasion is on the defendant.2 10 The drafters of the Code in-
cluded the defense to encourage the prevention of crime and as an induce-
ment to the disclosure of crimes before they occur.211
Because Missouri has virtually no case law discussing what constitutes
an effective withdrawal, it is helpful to look at general principles for-
mulated in other jurisdictions. 212 The rule that an accomplice may
withdraw from the commission of a crime is widely recognized, but a
defendant may successfully raise the defense only under certain cir-
cumstances. Sudden flight from the scene of the crime, 21 3 quiet
204. 162 Cal. 81, 121 P. 318 (1912).
205. Id. at 84, 121 P. at 319.
206. MO. PROPOSED CRIM. CODE § 7.070, Comment (1973).
207. RSMO § 556.170 (1969).
208. State v. Webb, 216 Mo. 378, 115 S.W. 998 (1909).
209. MO. PROPOSED CRIM. CODE § 7.070, Comment (1973).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See generally 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 89 (1961); W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, supra note 11, at 519-20.
213. Jeterv. State, 9 Md. App. 575,267 A.2d 319 (1970), affd, 261 Md. 221,
274 A.2d 337 (1971); State v. Forsha, 190 Mo. 296, 88 S.W. 746 (1905).
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withdrawal, 1 4 or mere change of heart2 5 is not sufficient for an effective
withdrawal. Some jurisidctions go so far as to examine the motives of the
accomplice in attempting to withdraw. In these jurisdictions, if his motive
to withdraw is based upon fear of apprehension or mere postponement of
the crime, it is not an effective withdrawal. 21 6
Under section 562.041.2(c) of the 1979 Missouri Criminal Code, there
are two ways an accomplice can make an effective withdrawal: By giving
timely warning to law enforcement authorities, or by otherwise making a
proper effort to prevent the commission of the crime. The first method is
straightforward and unambiguous. If an accomplice warns the proper
police authority while there is still time to prevent the commission of the
crime, he has effectively removed himself from liability. The second
method depends upon each fact situation, and Missouri courts will have to
interpret what constitutes a "proper effort" to prevent the commission of
the crime.
To make a proper effort to prevent the commission of the crime im-
plies some sort of affirmative action on the part of the accomplice. It pro-
bably would not be sufficient if the accomplice merely communicated his
intent to withdraw to his co-felons, although Missouri and some jurisdic-
tions have held this to be sufficient for an effective withdrawal. 217 Other
jurisdictions apply a stricter test by requiring that the accomplice must do
everything practicable to repudiate his prior aid and prevent the consum-
mation of the crime. 21 8 It is also generally accepted that this repudiation
must be communicated to the accomplice's co-felons. 21 9
Based on the 1979 Code provision, Missouri courts will probably adopt
the strict test. For an example, suppose A supplies burglary tools to B who
214. Karnes v. State, 159 Ark. 240, 252 S.W. 1 (1923); People v. Marx, 291
Ill. 40, 125 N.E. 719 (1919); People v. Lacey, 49 Ill. App. 2d 301, 200 N.E.2d 11
(1964); State v. Carver, 30 Ohio App. 2d 115, 283 N.E.2d 662 (1971), affd, 30
Ohio St. 2d 280, 285 N.E.2d 26, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972).
215. Karnes v. State, 159 Ark. 240, 252 S.W. 1 (1923); People v. King, 30
Cal. App. 2d 185, 85 P.2d 928 (1938); People v. Ortiz, 63 Cal. App. 662, 219 P.
1024 (1923).
216. State v. Morris, 10 N.C. 388 (1824); People v. Nichols, 230 N.Y. 221,
129 N.E. 883 (1921); Pollack v. State, 215 Wis. 200, 253 N.W. 560 (1934), affd
on rehearing, 215 Wis. 200, 254 N.W. 471 (1934). See also CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-10(b) (West 1972).
217. State v. Klein, 97 Conn. 321, 116 A. 596 (1922); State v. Allen, 47 Conn.
121 (1879); People v. Brown, 26 Ill. 2d 308, 186 N.E.2d 321 (1962); People v.
Rybka, 16 Ill. 2d 394, 158 N.E.2d 17 (1959); Jeter v. State, 9 Md. App. 575, 267
A.2d 319 (1970), affd, 261 Md. 221, 274 A.2d 337 (1971); State v. Peterson, 213
Minn. 56, 4 N.W.2d 826 (1942); State v. Webb, 216 Mo. 378, 115 S.W. 998
(1909); State v. Carver, 30 Ohio App. 2d 115, 283 N.E.2d 662 (1971), affd, 30
Ohio St. 2d 280, 285 N.E.2d 26, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972); Galan v.
State, 44 Ohio App. 192, 184 N.E. 40 (1932).
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will commit the actual burglary. Prior to the burglary, A decides to
withdraw from the crime. In order to make an effective withdrawal, he
must give timely warning to law enforcement authorities, or he must reac-
quire the burglary tools220 and communicate his intention of withdrawing
from the criminal enterprise to B. If the reacquisition of the burglary tools
is reasonably sufficient to prevent B from committing the burglary, A will
have made an effective withdrawal. If, however, A's reacquisition of the
burglary tools would in no way prevent B from committing the crime, A
would have to take additional measures to try to prevent the commission of
the crime.
The final requirement for an effective withdrawal is that the
withdrawal be "timely." It is too late for an accomplice to withdraw if the
criminal acts are in the process of consummation or have already been
completed. 22' There must be some appreciable interval between the alleg-
ed withdrawal and the criminal act. 222 The reasons for this requirement
are twofold. First, there must be sufficient opportunity for his co-felons to
follow his example and refrain from further action. 223 Second, there must
be sufficient opportunity for persons other than the co-felons to prevent
the commission of the offense. 224 In either case, prevention of the crime is
the goal.
Clearly, Missouri's new statute is aimed at prevention of crime2 25 and
serves as an escape route for an accomplice only when preventive measures
have been taken. It is not necessary that the crime actually be
prevented, 226 although some jurisdictions recognize the withdrawal only if
the eventual commission of the crime is attributable to some cause in-
dependent of the original aid furnished. 227 Comments to the 1972 Propos-
ed Code indicate that the Missouri legislature did not intend to impose this
220. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).
221. Karnes v. State, 159 Ark. 240, 252 S.W. 1 (1923); People v. Lacey, 49
Ill. App. 2d 301Q 200 N.E.2d 11 (1964); State v. Peterson, 213 Minn. 56, 4
N.W.2d 826 (1942); State v. Bailey, 383 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. 1964).
301, 200 N.E.2d 11 (1964); State v. Peterson, 213 Minn. 56, 4 N.W.2d 826
(1942); State v. Bailey, 383 S.W.2d 731 (Mo. 1964).
222. People v. King, 30 Cal. App. 2d 185, 85 P.2d 928 (1938); People v.
Ortiz, 63 Cal. App. 662, 219 P. 1024 (1923); People v. Lacey, 49 Ill. App. 2d 301,
200 N.E.2d 11 (1964); People v. Nichols, 230 N.Y. 221, 129 N.E. 883 (1921);
Pollack v. State, 215 Wis. 200, 253 N.W. 560, affd on rehearing, 215 Wis. 200,
254 N.W. 4M1 (1934).
223. People v. Lacey, 40 Ill. App. 2d 301, 200. 200, 253 N.W. 560, affd on
rehearing, 215 Wis. 200, 254 N.W. 471 (1934).
223. People v. Lacey, 40 Ill. App. 2d 301, 200 N.E.2d 11 (1964); People v.
Nichols, 230 N.Y. 221, 129 N.E. 883 (1921); Pollack v. State, 215 Wis. 200, 253
N.W. 560, affd on rehearing, 215 Wis. 200, 254 N.W. 471 (1934).
224. See cases cited note 223 supra.
225. MO. PROPOSED CRIM. CODE § 7.070, Comment (1973).
226. Id. See also State v. Allen, 47 Conn. 121 (1879).
227. People v. Ortiz, 63 Cal. App. 662, 219 P. 1024 (1923).
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heavy burden on an accomplice who attempts to escape liability by making
an effective withdrawal. 228 Instead, the accomplice carries only the burden
of persuading the jury that he made proper efforts to prevent the commis-
sion of the crime.2 29
VI. CONCLUSION
Although the new Missouri Criminal Code institutes several major
theoretical changes, the new provisions will in practice affect only a few
cases. The Code generally provides clear and consistent guidelines for the
imposition of accomplice liability. The judiciary must of course interpret
to fill the interstices, and this comment has attempted to suggest areas the
courts may consider and ideas they might adopt. The Code's most notable
features are the state of mind requirements. By providing that a defen-
dant's punishment shall be assessed according to his personal culpability
rather than that of a third party, it aligns Missouri accomplice liability
theory with accepted principles of modem criminal justice.
CAROL A. SCHWAB
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